Someone asked me recently whether I have written any article about this unit, my answer is no. VAT 69 is one of the two Malaysian ultra secret special mission unit alongside their millitary counterpart the 11 RGK.
VAT 69 was formed in 1969 hence their numerical designation to hunt the communist on its own turf and terms, originating as a long range recon unit, with mission ranging from assasination of top CT (communist terrorist) commanders to disrupting enemy supply line.
Nothing much is written about this formidable unit except for one authored by its former Commanding Office SAC Navaratnam titled "The Spear & The Kerambit" It gives us a sneak peek inside the VAT 69, the highly motivated men behind it, its operations and success and most importantly what it means to be VAT 69 operatives.
The unit boast the highest number of CT kills among the Malaysian security services, obviously due close affiliation between the Jungle Squad of Special Branch in which most A1 information are passed by the latter to the former. If i am not mistaken it is rumored that the legendary officer from this unit ASP Zabry holds the highest record of CT individuals killed by single person.ASP Zabry was a man with acute jungle knowledge especially in areas of fieldcraft and bobbytrap. He is also fearless and a source of insipration for the those he lead. Unfortunately Malaysian history is silent on his sacrifices, he died at the youthful age of 28 leading his men from the front.
I suspect since their organization was set up by the SAS, its order of battle might mirror that of SAS, with some units within it that maybe peculiar only to Malaysia.
Whatever it is ....you dont want their barrel pointing at u, since they dont miss....
Regards,
G.Jeyaganesh
Thursday, September 15, 2011
Tuesday, September 13, 2011
F-22 To Fly Again
After being grounded since May 2011 due to toxic fumes from the engines sipping through the pilot life system,which caused few accidents and one death, the Raptor is poised to take to the skies again.
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
SGPV: A STRATEGIC SPEAR
The recent spate concerning the awarding of contract to Boustead Shipyard to built 6 x Second Generation Patrol Vessel – Littoral Combat Ship (SGPV-LCS) with Defense Minister and Opposition MP trading garbs at each other became front page new all over the country.
The crux of the contention has been the cost of building the sanctioned 6 x SGPV-LCS reportedly at RM 6 billion in total. While the Defense Minister defended the cost of purchase, opposition MP Tony Pua pointed out that the actual cost should be much lower by citing examples from other navies patrol vessel.
The defense of the realm is of paramount importance whereby strategic, operational and tactical plans are of utmost secrecy. However the same cannot be said of defense purchases of systems/platforms, since the citizens are the stakeholders of the system/platforms purchased under the ambit of national defense or security concern.
This is clear when the Defense Minister announced the contract amount awarded to Boustead Shipyard in the tune of RM 6 billion for the 6 ships. It must be noted at this juncture that any government throughout the world is at liberty not to reveal the detail specification of the systems/platforms, in order to keep the element surprise intact. Military planners prior to acquisition of a system/platform will conduct a “threat analysis and “threat scenario”. This exercise is designed to update the security apparatus with the current regional scenario, military equabilirium, strike potential of possible opposing forces and our own counter measures. Based on this analysis, there exist clear threats then this can be only countered by employing, purchasing or acquisitions of certain systems/platforms. The threats can be actual or perceived based on future defence planning and acquisition of potential opposing forces.
In this case the Royal Malaysian Navy have done its due diligence by conducting this analysis and recommended to the Defence Ministry the urgent need to for SGPV-LCS.
SGPV as the name denotes should not be confused with patrol craft or fast attack craft. SGPV is continuation of the NGPV (Next Generation Patrol Vessel) or Kedah Class Offshore Patrol Vessel in the RMN. In essence the size is similar to a light frigate or more aptly corvette classification of naval vessel. The term SGPV is actually a euphemism used to refer to a highly sophisticated state of the art corvette. Cordial neighbours do not wish to inadvertently start an arms race by announcing the purchase of a highly offensive system/platform, but rather beef up their capabilities in more subtle way. Thus, the naming of what would otherwise be a guided corvette as a patrol vessel. Euphemism is usually a norm in military through out the world in order to mask the actual mission or the mission orientation of a particular system/platform. During the period of British Army operation in Northern Ireland, “to be converted into her majesty’s permanent custody” means assassination of known Irish Republican Army (IRA) targets. United States effort to counter the superior Soviet technology in Multiple Independent Re-Entry Vehicle (MIRV) led to the development Anti Ballistics Missile Shield, which was euphemistically known as Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). There are numerous other examples in military parlance where euphemism is applied countless times.
Let us see some of the specs that SGPV-LCS will posses, it would be 99.5m in length and 2200 ton in displacement. The tonnage itself reveals that the SGPV is more of frigate and comparable to the Gawron Class Corvettes of Polish Navy or Korvette 130 of German Navy. The SGPV is reported to pack a deadly punch in the form of VLS (Vertical Launch System) which can be used to launch surface to air missile and surface or surface to surface missile to destroy target. Wide array of sensors, Combat Information Centre (CIC), Electronic Weapons Suite (EWS), Close In Weapon System (CIWS) and main guns in the form of either 76mm Otobreda or French 100mm Naval Gun clearly reveals this SGPV-LCS is no ordinary patrol craft.
Tony Pua’s argument that the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) purchased a similar vessel at cost of RM 210 million is perplexing. What type or class of the RNZN vessel is being compared against RMN SGPV-LCS. Based on the length and displacement closest comparison to SGPV are the Protector Class OPV of RNZN both HMNZs Otago and Wellington. However one must note that this ship was contracted in 2004 to Tenix Defense of Australia. We need to take into account cost escalation till date, which is almost 6 years more importantly what capability this OPV possess. New Zealand defence posture is very much different from us, whereby New Zealand has defence treaty with both Australia and US in times of war. It is also a member of ABCA (America, Britain, Canada & Australia) Armies basically countries which share the same mother tongue and origin. No one dare to attack New Zeland without facing the wrath of US and Australia. Further the HMNZS Otago and Wellington are poorly armed devoid of any sensors, EWS Suite but equipped only with optical fire control. Its main gun is Bushmaster 242 25mm cannon, no CIWS and surprisingly has 3 x 20foot container usually found in container vessel and has quarters and provision for 30 passengers and an aft crane. It looks like Protector Class is built with disaster relief and logistics support as its primary mission rather than as an interdiction vessel. Now compare it with our Kedah Class the earlier NGPV, it has 76mm main oto Melara Gun, 1 x 30mm gun, EWS Suite, Thermal Imaging, Nav Radar and Sonar. The cost of systems and armaments for a vessel can be higher than the cost of building the ship, more so in the current face evolving electronic warfare spectrum. The Protector class does not augur well to be compared with our Kedah class let alone to be compared with the latest SGPV. The SGPV will also incorporate the VLS technology which might take up a major portion of the cost. Earlier attempts were made to compare our SGPV with Pohang Class Patrol Craft that was supplied to Timor Navy.
The rightful comparison should be with the Singapore Formidable Class which is the Lafeyette Class of France. Even though the SGPV is smaller, the sensors aboard will replicate the latest LCS similar to Freedom and Independence class of US Navy. SGPV will be much more sophisticated, modern and costly due to incorporation of latest technology. Further the cost of amortization of local shipyard with transfer of technology has to be taken into account. Military acquisition are very much public fund initiative, whereby main contributors are the government and its grant. A glaring example will be the United States with the development of LCS being fully funded by US government, whereby both Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics participated in designing, building and commissioning of the vessel into US Navy and greatly benefited from the government grants in terms of R&D.
While I respect the concern of Tony Pua in raising issues related to public spending and national security, his argument has to be more specific and precise. With the current volatile security environment throughout the world, the nature of military operation maybe more of MOOTW (military operation other than war) like fighting pirates of the coast of Somali or called upon by international community to protect innocent civilians from tyrant. Given inherent the capabilities of the SGPV it is able to conduct any of these multitude mission on a broad variety of spectrum.
SGPV will be a vital tool for both Malaysian foreign and defence policy and shall be the tip of our strategic spear. I commend the Navy especially its Chief Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz in remaining firm in its acquisition despite calls from arm chair military analysts and those with ulterior political motives.
Jeyaganesh Gopalsamy
The crux of the contention has been the cost of building the sanctioned 6 x SGPV-LCS reportedly at RM 6 billion in total. While the Defense Minister defended the cost of purchase, opposition MP Tony Pua pointed out that the actual cost should be much lower by citing examples from other navies patrol vessel.
The defense of the realm is of paramount importance whereby strategic, operational and tactical plans are of utmost secrecy. However the same cannot be said of defense purchases of systems/platforms, since the citizens are the stakeholders of the system/platforms purchased under the ambit of national defense or security concern.
This is clear when the Defense Minister announced the contract amount awarded to Boustead Shipyard in the tune of RM 6 billion for the 6 ships. It must be noted at this juncture that any government throughout the world is at liberty not to reveal the detail specification of the systems/platforms, in order to keep the element surprise intact. Military planners prior to acquisition of a system/platform will conduct a “threat analysis and “threat scenario”. This exercise is designed to update the security apparatus with the current regional scenario, military equabilirium, strike potential of possible opposing forces and our own counter measures. Based on this analysis, there exist clear threats then this can be only countered by employing, purchasing or acquisitions of certain systems/platforms. The threats can be actual or perceived based on future defence planning and acquisition of potential opposing forces.
In this case the Royal Malaysian Navy have done its due diligence by conducting this analysis and recommended to the Defence Ministry the urgent need to for SGPV-LCS.
SGPV as the name denotes should not be confused with patrol craft or fast attack craft. SGPV is continuation of the NGPV (Next Generation Patrol Vessel) or Kedah Class Offshore Patrol Vessel in the RMN. In essence the size is similar to a light frigate or more aptly corvette classification of naval vessel. The term SGPV is actually a euphemism used to refer to a highly sophisticated state of the art corvette. Cordial neighbours do not wish to inadvertently start an arms race by announcing the purchase of a highly offensive system/platform, but rather beef up their capabilities in more subtle way. Thus, the naming of what would otherwise be a guided corvette as a patrol vessel. Euphemism is usually a norm in military through out the world in order to mask the actual mission or the mission orientation of a particular system/platform. During the period of British Army operation in Northern Ireland, “to be converted into her majesty’s permanent custody” means assassination of known Irish Republican Army (IRA) targets. United States effort to counter the superior Soviet technology in Multiple Independent Re-Entry Vehicle (MIRV) led to the development Anti Ballistics Missile Shield, which was euphemistically known as Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). There are numerous other examples in military parlance where euphemism is applied countless times.
Let us see some of the specs that SGPV-LCS will posses, it would be 99.5m in length and 2200 ton in displacement. The tonnage itself reveals that the SGPV is more of frigate and comparable to the Gawron Class Corvettes of Polish Navy or Korvette 130 of German Navy. The SGPV is reported to pack a deadly punch in the form of VLS (Vertical Launch System) which can be used to launch surface to air missile and surface or surface to surface missile to destroy target. Wide array of sensors, Combat Information Centre (CIC), Electronic Weapons Suite (EWS), Close In Weapon System (CIWS) and main guns in the form of either 76mm Otobreda or French 100mm Naval Gun clearly reveals this SGPV-LCS is no ordinary patrol craft.
Tony Pua’s argument that the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) purchased a similar vessel at cost of RM 210 million is perplexing. What type or class of the RNZN vessel is being compared against RMN SGPV-LCS. Based on the length and displacement closest comparison to SGPV are the Protector Class OPV of RNZN both HMNZs Otago and Wellington. However one must note that this ship was contracted in 2004 to Tenix Defense of Australia. We need to take into account cost escalation till date, which is almost 6 years more importantly what capability this OPV possess. New Zealand defence posture is very much different from us, whereby New Zealand has defence treaty with both Australia and US in times of war. It is also a member of ABCA (America, Britain, Canada & Australia) Armies basically countries which share the same mother tongue and origin. No one dare to attack New Zeland without facing the wrath of US and Australia. Further the HMNZS Otago and Wellington are poorly armed devoid of any sensors, EWS Suite but equipped only with optical fire control. Its main gun is Bushmaster 242 25mm cannon, no CIWS and surprisingly has 3 x 20foot container usually found in container vessel and has quarters and provision for 30 passengers and an aft crane. It looks like Protector Class is built with disaster relief and logistics support as its primary mission rather than as an interdiction vessel. Now compare it with our Kedah Class the earlier NGPV, it has 76mm main oto Melara Gun, 1 x 30mm gun, EWS Suite, Thermal Imaging, Nav Radar and Sonar. The cost of systems and armaments for a vessel can be higher than the cost of building the ship, more so in the current face evolving electronic warfare spectrum. The Protector class does not augur well to be compared with our Kedah class let alone to be compared with the latest SGPV. The SGPV will also incorporate the VLS technology which might take up a major portion of the cost. Earlier attempts were made to compare our SGPV with Pohang Class Patrol Craft that was supplied to Timor Navy.
The rightful comparison should be with the Singapore Formidable Class which is the Lafeyette Class of France. Even though the SGPV is smaller, the sensors aboard will replicate the latest LCS similar to Freedom and Independence class of US Navy. SGPV will be much more sophisticated, modern and costly due to incorporation of latest technology. Further the cost of amortization of local shipyard with transfer of technology has to be taken into account. Military acquisition are very much public fund initiative, whereby main contributors are the government and its grant. A glaring example will be the United States with the development of LCS being fully funded by US government, whereby both Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics participated in designing, building and commissioning of the vessel into US Navy and greatly benefited from the government grants in terms of R&D.
While I respect the concern of Tony Pua in raising issues related to public spending and national security, his argument has to be more specific and precise. With the current volatile security environment throughout the world, the nature of military operation maybe more of MOOTW (military operation other than war) like fighting pirates of the coast of Somali or called upon by international community to protect innocent civilians from tyrant. Given inherent the capabilities of the SGPV it is able to conduct any of these multitude mission on a broad variety of spectrum.
SGPV will be a vital tool for both Malaysian foreign and defence policy and shall be the tip of our strategic spear. I commend the Navy especially its Chief Admiral Tan Sri Abdul Aziz in remaining firm in its acquisition despite calls from arm chair military analysts and those with ulterior political motives.
Jeyaganesh Gopalsamy
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
BATTLE OF YEONPYEONG ISLAN
Yeonpyeong Island Artillery Exchange 23rd of Nov, 2010.
1.0 OBJECTIVE
To analyze the lexicon between strategic and tactical level response by Republic of Korea forces viz a viz Democratic People Republic of Kores attack on Yeonpyeong Island on the 23rd of November, 2010.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
During the early part of cold war the defense of Republic Of Korea (hereinafter ROK) was entrusted with the United Nation Command (UNC) whereby ROK forces only play a supporting role, even though the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1953 was in already in place between ROK-US in the aftermath of Korean War. MDT calls for either country to come to the aid of another in case of war and attack on one country to be considered as an attack on both. By invoking this treaty ROK entered the Vietnam War in support of US forces in 1968, even though ROK actual motive is to gain access to United States latest weapon technologies and much needed US dollars in foreign exchange. However since1970s the defense of ROK has became the shared responsibilities of ROK-US forces under the Combined Forces Command (CFC), in which the lead forces are United States Forces in Korea (USFK).
Both North and South Korea has been at each others throats since the guns went silent on the eve of 27th of July, 1953.A war of attrition ensued between both with a series of sabotages, skirmishes and raid carried out by Democratic Peoples Republic of Kores (DPRK) constantly to undermine the government of ROK. Incidents such as Bluehouse Raid in 1968 by DPRK Special Forces, bombing of KAL 859 in 1987 by DPRK agents, and midget submarine excursion into ROK coastline in late 1990s are some of the widely known examples undertaken by DPRK to achieve its goal. Thus it is clear for the better part of cold war and the ensuing decades both Koreas by virtue of being technically at war has pursued a deadly game of brinkmanship while the world held its breadth.
3.0 PREFACE
In order to have a proper comprehension of the artillery barrages on Yeonpyeong Island, we need to go back to the 1990s when DPRK formally declared Inter –Korean Maritime Demarcation Line (MDL) which is further south, as opposed to accepting the Northern Limit Line (NLL) enforced by UNC and ROK since 1953. Tension rose when both Koreas insisted on enforcing their version of demarcation line and erupted into what is known as First Battle of Yeonpyeong Island in 1999. Republic of Korean Navy (ROKN) adhering to rules of engagement used “bumping maneuvers” to push the DPRK boats back across the NLL. However when one of the DPRK boats open fire, the ROKN responded with ruthless efficiency, one DPRK boat was sunk and 3 others limped back to harbour with severe damages. There was a reduction in DPRK aggressive patrolling near the NLL after this incident. In 2002 while the entire ROK was basking in the world cup fever jointly hosted with Japan, DPRK struck again. This time the first round from a DPRK boat scored a direct hit on the bridge of ROKN corvette Chamsuri, taking the life of ROKN taskforce commander Lt Cmdr Yoon Youngha. The latest in the series of provocation was the sinking of ROKN Cheonan a “Pohang Class” Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) corvette. The irony of this incident was an ASW vessel sunk by the very submarine it was designed to hunt and kill. Independent investigators confirmed that the sinking was caused by a DPRK manufactured CHT-02D torpedo, an allegation that DPRK government vehemently denies.
The response by the ROK government in light of this evidence was contrary to President MB Lee tough rhetoric against DRPK during his election campaign. Instead of carrying out a set of Operation Plan (OPLAN) that gives MB Lee offensive option as the Supreme Commander of ROK forces, he chose to conduct live firing exercises purported to deter DPRK. Exercise Haguk Eagle and Ulchi-Focus Lens are some of the brigade and division level exercise conducted by ROK forces as a show of force and deterrence against DPRK. The DPRK artillery barrages on Yeonpyeong Island on 23rd November, 2010 clearly revealed all the exercise conducted by ROK force was in essence an exercise in futility and failed to deter DPRK.
On the 23rd of November, 2010 ROK Marines on Yeonpyeong Island initiated live firing exercise as part of EX-Haguk Eagle, only to be met with torrent of artillery shells from DPRK.
4.0 BOMBARDMENT
At 1000hrs local time on the 23rd of November, 2010 ignoring the calls by DRPK to halt Exercise Haguk ROK forces started live firing drills from Yeonpyeomg Island. Their 155mm guns were aimed at the South –South West of Yellow Sea. At 1430 hrs DPRK fired the first salvos of 122mm Multi Launched Rocket System (MLRS) purported to be from batteries located along the coast of Mudo and Kaemori and brought all their guns to bear on the island of Yeonpyeong. Of the 150 rounds fired by DPRK in the first salvo about 60 landed on the island, later when the DPRK got proper calibration for their guns of the 20 rounds fired in the second salvo all landed in Yeonpyeong. What puzzles the world over is that DPRK barrages hit the island with pinpoint accuracy, which is in stark contrast to ROK responses which can be regarded as abysmal. Even though technologically, ROK forces is far superior compared to DPRK in terms of equipments and weapons. The time lapse between the North Koreas barrages and the ROK respond was an agonizing 9 minutes during which time DPRK’s MLRS units could have re-positioned itself and any counter-fire from ROK would have been futile.
Yeonpyeong being at the forefront of a potential warzone and one of the last out post of cold war should have been fortified and reinforced sufficiently. However based on the response by ROK we can deduce the following:-
1) Did not act on intelligence provided by National Intelligence Service (NIS)
2) Did not have proper early warning system in Yeonpyeong Island
3) Lack of situational awareness among “on scene commanders”
4) Incoherent chain of command
5) Failures of equipments
It is beyond doubt that the Commanding Officers of ROK Marines stationed on the island failed to act upon this vital piece of intelligence provided Korean NIS. NIS has informed the ROK Joint Chief of Staff that DPRK has reinforced forward artillery units in Mudo and Kaemori. Yeonpyeong Island is in direct line of sight and cross hair of the DPRK gun barrels from these 2 positions. If the ROK top echelon commanders reacted to this intelligence, Yeonpyeong Island should have been reinforced with more artillery pieces, counter-jamming equipments and counter battery firing radar, in light of the movement by DPRK.
Early warning systems are absolute necessity when operating close to hostile area, since both opposing forces will be on the trigger constantly. Round the clock monitoring of ground, sea and air movement beyond visual range is vital in order to have an advantage over the enemy. Additionally as the name denotes it would serve as a warning towards any adventurism by the enemy. Ground surveillance radar or AWACS in the sky would have clearly made out the movement of DRPK artillery in real time. Platforms like RC-135 Rivet Joint which eavesdrop on enemy communication and other types of Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) could have revealed increased in chatter prior to DPRK deployment. E-8 JSTAR with it side looking APY-7 phased array antenna could have picked up any ground movement by DPRK. Further satellites even commercial ones could have detected this unusual movement in DPRK prior to HAGUK as evidenced by the Israeli EROS-B satellites picture of Kaemori & Mudo a day after the incident. Further based on various information via SIGINT, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) ROK forces could have requested the assistance of Detachment 2 Strategic Recon Wing (SRW) by air tasking the ultra-secret U-2 to conduct a recon flight to verify movement by DPRK and with data-link pass this information to tactical level on ground in real time.
Ground sensors in the form of counter-battery firing radar like ANPTQ-36 synonymous with any theater level artillery deployment could precisely pinpoint any enemy artillery firing position. It could provide firing solutions for ROK artillery thereby launching a rapid, sustained and accurate counter artillery fire on DPRK positions within seconds. This seems to be lacking since it took a staggering 9 minutes for ROK to realize they are being attacked and figure out the position of DPRK artillery. Further ROK counter fire seems punitive a mere 80 round as compared to 160 rounds fired by DPRK. Conventional tactical doctrine calls for massive counter fire when attacked in order to suppress the enemy fire. However this was not the case in Yeonpyeong the performance of ROK forces were questionable and most importantly the accuracy. Out of 80 rounds only 10 landed in DPRK territory, and for a country which prides itself in electronic supremacy this is a major embarrassment. Whereas, credit has to be given to DPRK accuracy and tenacity in the face of overwhelming technologically superior ROK forces, to the point most shells hit military barracks. After action report from ROK forces clearly shows that all rounds from DPRK slammed onto military targets with some stray shells hitting civilian population. In light of the small size of Yeonpyeong Island and its close proximity between civilian and the ROK Marine barracks it is inevitable that civilian casualties do occur.
Clueless commanders, once the rounds start raining down, on scene commanders seems to lose all initiative. Being forward deployed without any heavy support proves too much for the on scene commander to bear. ROK being indoctrinated with US & Nato military operation method calls for heavy support to be present before initiating an offensive or counter fire. Therefore from the timeline of ROK forces after action report it is clear ROK Marines only returned fire after ROKAF mounted an emergency sortie (whatever that means) close to Yeonpyeong Island. Loss of initiative leads to failure to improvise with minimal support. The ROK Marines commander should have returned fire immediately and requested for close air support/ground interdiction by providing the target coordinates to ROKAF in order to neutralize the point of threat in Mudo and Kaemori.
An incoherent chain of command with orders from the top echelon leaders, ambiguous. After action report reveals orders from Joint Chief of Staffs were “to return fire but not to provoke”. An army relies on clear and unambiguous orders to carry out its mission. Unclear and ambiguous orders will usually leads to confusion and disaster. In essence when the orders came from top upper echelon “return fire but do not provoke” it meant the ROK forces were fighting with one hand tied behind their back.
Equipment failing to perform as per the specification listed by the manufacturer is another factor that needs to be looked into. The main platform/system capable of providing counter fire in Yeonpyeong Island is the Samsung Techwin 155mm Self Propelled Howitzer (SPH) K-9 Thunder. It has an uncanny resemblance of the M109 Paladin the mainstay of US Army SPH. Being equipped with sophisticated on board sensors, it should have neutralized the much outdated North Korean 122mm MLRS. The poor performance of K-9Thunder further adds to the negative perception concerning the ROK force response. The scanning, tracking, target acquisition capability of K-9 seems questionable. If the K-9 Thunder target acquisition was flawless it could have taken out the DPRK artillery within seconds. By using its TOT (time over target) mode it could ripple fire 3 155mm shells within 15 seconds and timed to arrive on target simultaneously with absolute precision.
5.0 POSTCRIPT
ROK forces must have taken all necessary measures to deter the DPRK from undertaking any provocation during the exercise. F-15K and F-16 of ROKAF should have conducted CAP (combat air patrol) sorties during the training, while RF-4 Phantom mount an aerial reconnaissance to monitor situation and take action should the need arise. ROKN should have deployed capital ships KDX-111 and Munmu class destroyers close to Yeonpyeong Island prior to the training exercise to provide over the horizon targeting capability and additional fire-power from its 92 Vertical Launch System (VLS), in case of DPRK provocations.
The ROKM barracks in Yeonpyeong Island should have been reinforced with regular marines/soldiers to supplement the national service marines stationed there. By right ROK forces should have deployed all these elements in order to counter any multitude of threats from DPRK. By check mating DPRK in all potential spectrums of threats and in every dimension of battle, ROK forces might have responded better to the artillery firing on Yeonpyeong. In the aftermath of ROKN Cheonan sinking, ROK forces should have conducted more direct exercises designed to carry out numerous Operational Plan (OPLAN) with a clear deterrence message to DPRK. OPLAN are secret dossiers which outline among others set piece offensive operation against DPRK that would give CFC commanders variety of options. According to a premier military website GlobalSecurity.org, ROK-US forces have specific set of OPLAN for a multitude of threat scenario from DPRK. The CFC regularly conducts brigade and division level exercises to hone their skills in this regards. Therefore ROK should have initiated this set of options available in OPLAN to neutralize the DPRK firing on Yeonpyoeng Island. In fact as a direct response to the bombardment ROK forces should have carried out these OPLAN, instead of conducting live firing exercise. Show of force is designed to deter potential aggressor and not as it literally means as a show for display and entertainment purpose. ROK forces show of force in the aftermath of Choenan and Yeonpyeong seems designed to show ROK citizens that the government considers DPRK aggression seriously and would use is might to vanquish DPRK. ROK rather than conduct a show of force which failed miserably in the aftermath of Cheonan, should have carried out the following OPLAN:-
5.1 OPLAN 5027 (Major Theater War)
This OPLAN calls for the defense of ROK in case of surprise attack by DPRK over the DMZ. 70% of DPRK forces and equipment are poised within 100 miles from DMZ and they could launch surprise attack within moment notice. Further DPRK artillery barrages could fire around 500,000 rounds per hour on Seoul. By taking into account this scenario, ROK forces have the highest density of troops to area ratio in the world. With 1 Division every 10 km, ROK forces are capable of foiling any massive incursion by DPRK. Further the 3 main corridors of entry into South Korea(Kaesong-Munsan, Chorwon and Kumwa) are heavily defended by ROK forces. ROK forces could withstand and absorb a punishing DRPK offensive by holding the line for at least 5 days, during which time reinforcement from US Forces in Japan and US Pacific Command will arrive. Exercise Foal Eagle (RSOI) Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration conducted between USFK and ROK confirms RSOI can be achieved within 5 days. The first 5 days would determine the outcome of the war and based on ROK ORBAT, reinforcement and RSOI timing ROK could hold the line for 5 days. CFC then within 6- 10 days could mount an offensive to crush the DPRK aggression.
5.2 OPLAN 5026 (Air Strikes)
DPRK opting for a nuclear strike is the worst case scenario that could happen in Korean peninsula. By using OPLAN 5026 USAF, USN and ROKAF are capable of mounting pre-emptive simultaneous surgical strike against high value target sites like Yongbyon and other DRPK nuclear facilities site. The combined aerial armada of USAF-ROKAF could neutralize these threats in the event of belligerent posture from DPRK. ROK cannot allow DPRK the option to go nuclear and at the outset of hostilities these sites has to be taken out. OPLAN 5026 are designed specifically for such scenario and based on regular exercise conducted by ROKAF-USAK like COPE Thunder, Cope Korea and Red Flag it has the capability to mount such an audacious strike. By using smart weapons like JDAM and stand off weapons like JSOW, it could severely reduce the war waging capabilities of the North.
5.3 OPLAN 5030 (Roll Back)
The operational plan calls for ROK to fight a battle of attrition with DPRK by slowly strangling and snuffing it out economically. This similar to what United States effectively did to USSR during the cold war.
5.4 Other OPLAN
There are numerous other OPLAN that ROK political leadership could have considered and initiated.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The father of modern strategy Thucydides once quipped “no one is fool enough to choose the path or war instead of peace, in peace sons bury their father and in war father bury their sons”. DPRK has repeatedly provoked and has been on war footing against ROK since 1953. The decision to go to war is not an easy one as there are dire consequences an entire generation may be wiped out as it happened during WW1. At the same time ROK should not allow it to be held at ransom by DPRK.
Edward Luttwak in his article “Give War A Chance” wrote the natural phenomena of war has to be given an opportunity for it to come to a decisive and conclusive end. War has to come to end on its own without the intervention of peace-keeping force, ceasefire or mediation. It has to end with one side capitulating. This is more so in the case of Korean peninsula, in which both Koreas has been technically at war since 1953. Both ROK and DPRK should stop being the pawn in the superpower games of political chess by initiating a full scale war with one side emerging as the sole victor and unifier of Korea.
The onus is more on ROK which is technologically, militarily and economically more superior that DPRK to bring to end the division of Korea. The sinking of Cheonan and bombardment of Yeonpyeong provided ROK with such an opportunity but it failed to re-act upon it. Instead MB Lee went on with soap opera style rhetoric and ordered pointless live firing exercise without any iron fist response. The latest debacle on Pyeongyeong clearly proves that DPRK is not deterred by ROK and ROK does not have the political will to retaliate. The DRPK is aware of this lack of will on the part ROK leadership and in every incident DPRK manage to yield maximum political, economical and not forgetting face saving mileage at the expense of ROK.
The only way to end this unending cycle of violence is for ROK to mount a lightning and crippling blitzkrieg on DPRK. It would provide the DPRK with a fait accompli before it could recover from the initial shock. It has to do it urgently since with the DRPK leadership baton passed on to a young Kim Jong Un, who has the rest of his life to continue what is forefathers did extremely well, which is to terrorize the south.
Jeyaganesh Gopalsamy
LLB Hons (WALES), M.A Strategy (UKM)
14th of January, 2011
1.0 OBJECTIVE
To analyze the lexicon between strategic and tactical level response by Republic of Korea forces viz a viz Democratic People Republic of Kores attack on Yeonpyeong Island on the 23rd of November, 2010.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
During the early part of cold war the defense of Republic Of Korea (hereinafter ROK) was entrusted with the United Nation Command (UNC) whereby ROK forces only play a supporting role, even though the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1953 was in already in place between ROK-US in the aftermath of Korean War. MDT calls for either country to come to the aid of another in case of war and attack on one country to be considered as an attack on both. By invoking this treaty ROK entered the Vietnam War in support of US forces in 1968, even though ROK actual motive is to gain access to United States latest weapon technologies and much needed US dollars in foreign exchange. However since1970s the defense of ROK has became the shared responsibilities of ROK-US forces under the Combined Forces Command (CFC), in which the lead forces are United States Forces in Korea (USFK).
Both North and South Korea has been at each others throats since the guns went silent on the eve of 27th of July, 1953.A war of attrition ensued between both with a series of sabotages, skirmishes and raid carried out by Democratic Peoples Republic of Kores (DPRK) constantly to undermine the government of ROK. Incidents such as Bluehouse Raid in 1968 by DPRK Special Forces, bombing of KAL 859 in 1987 by DPRK agents, and midget submarine excursion into ROK coastline in late 1990s are some of the widely known examples undertaken by DPRK to achieve its goal. Thus it is clear for the better part of cold war and the ensuing decades both Koreas by virtue of being technically at war has pursued a deadly game of brinkmanship while the world held its breadth.
3.0 PREFACE
In order to have a proper comprehension of the artillery barrages on Yeonpyeong Island, we need to go back to the 1990s when DPRK formally declared Inter –Korean Maritime Demarcation Line (MDL) which is further south, as opposed to accepting the Northern Limit Line (NLL) enforced by UNC and ROK since 1953. Tension rose when both Koreas insisted on enforcing their version of demarcation line and erupted into what is known as First Battle of Yeonpyeong Island in 1999. Republic of Korean Navy (ROKN) adhering to rules of engagement used “bumping maneuvers” to push the DPRK boats back across the NLL. However when one of the DPRK boats open fire, the ROKN responded with ruthless efficiency, one DPRK boat was sunk and 3 others limped back to harbour with severe damages. There was a reduction in DPRK aggressive patrolling near the NLL after this incident. In 2002 while the entire ROK was basking in the world cup fever jointly hosted with Japan, DPRK struck again. This time the first round from a DPRK boat scored a direct hit on the bridge of ROKN corvette Chamsuri, taking the life of ROKN taskforce commander Lt Cmdr Yoon Youngha. The latest in the series of provocation was the sinking of ROKN Cheonan a “Pohang Class” Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) corvette. The irony of this incident was an ASW vessel sunk by the very submarine it was designed to hunt and kill. Independent investigators confirmed that the sinking was caused by a DPRK manufactured CHT-02D torpedo, an allegation that DPRK government vehemently denies.
The response by the ROK government in light of this evidence was contrary to President MB Lee tough rhetoric against DRPK during his election campaign. Instead of carrying out a set of Operation Plan (OPLAN) that gives MB Lee offensive option as the Supreme Commander of ROK forces, he chose to conduct live firing exercises purported to deter DPRK. Exercise Haguk Eagle and Ulchi-Focus Lens are some of the brigade and division level exercise conducted by ROK forces as a show of force and deterrence against DPRK. The DPRK artillery barrages on Yeonpyeong Island on 23rd November, 2010 clearly revealed all the exercise conducted by ROK force was in essence an exercise in futility and failed to deter DPRK.
On the 23rd of November, 2010 ROK Marines on Yeonpyeong Island initiated live firing exercise as part of EX-Haguk Eagle, only to be met with torrent of artillery shells from DPRK.
4.0 BOMBARDMENT
At 1000hrs local time on the 23rd of November, 2010 ignoring the calls by DRPK to halt Exercise Haguk ROK forces started live firing drills from Yeonpyeomg Island. Their 155mm guns were aimed at the South –South West of Yellow Sea. At 1430 hrs DPRK fired the first salvos of 122mm Multi Launched Rocket System (MLRS) purported to be from batteries located along the coast of Mudo and Kaemori and brought all their guns to bear on the island of Yeonpyeong. Of the 150 rounds fired by DPRK in the first salvo about 60 landed on the island, later when the DPRK got proper calibration for their guns of the 20 rounds fired in the second salvo all landed in Yeonpyeong. What puzzles the world over is that DPRK barrages hit the island with pinpoint accuracy, which is in stark contrast to ROK responses which can be regarded as abysmal. Even though technologically, ROK forces is far superior compared to DPRK in terms of equipments and weapons. The time lapse between the North Koreas barrages and the ROK respond was an agonizing 9 minutes during which time DPRK’s MLRS units could have re-positioned itself and any counter-fire from ROK would have been futile.
Yeonpyeong being at the forefront of a potential warzone and one of the last out post of cold war should have been fortified and reinforced sufficiently. However based on the response by ROK we can deduce the following:-
1) Did not act on intelligence provided by National Intelligence Service (NIS)
2) Did not have proper early warning system in Yeonpyeong Island
3) Lack of situational awareness among “on scene commanders”
4) Incoherent chain of command
5) Failures of equipments
It is beyond doubt that the Commanding Officers of ROK Marines stationed on the island failed to act upon this vital piece of intelligence provided Korean NIS. NIS has informed the ROK Joint Chief of Staff that DPRK has reinforced forward artillery units in Mudo and Kaemori. Yeonpyeong Island is in direct line of sight and cross hair of the DPRK gun barrels from these 2 positions. If the ROK top echelon commanders reacted to this intelligence, Yeonpyeong Island should have been reinforced with more artillery pieces, counter-jamming equipments and counter battery firing radar, in light of the movement by DPRK.
Early warning systems are absolute necessity when operating close to hostile area, since both opposing forces will be on the trigger constantly. Round the clock monitoring of ground, sea and air movement beyond visual range is vital in order to have an advantage over the enemy. Additionally as the name denotes it would serve as a warning towards any adventurism by the enemy. Ground surveillance radar or AWACS in the sky would have clearly made out the movement of DRPK artillery in real time. Platforms like RC-135 Rivet Joint which eavesdrop on enemy communication and other types of Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) could have revealed increased in chatter prior to DPRK deployment. E-8 JSTAR with it side looking APY-7 phased array antenna could have picked up any ground movement by DPRK. Further satellites even commercial ones could have detected this unusual movement in DPRK prior to HAGUK as evidenced by the Israeli EROS-B satellites picture of Kaemori & Mudo a day after the incident. Further based on various information via SIGINT, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) ROK forces could have requested the assistance of Detachment 2 Strategic Recon Wing (SRW) by air tasking the ultra-secret U-2 to conduct a recon flight to verify movement by DPRK and with data-link pass this information to tactical level on ground in real time.
Ground sensors in the form of counter-battery firing radar like ANPTQ-36 synonymous with any theater level artillery deployment could precisely pinpoint any enemy artillery firing position. It could provide firing solutions for ROK artillery thereby launching a rapid, sustained and accurate counter artillery fire on DPRK positions within seconds. This seems to be lacking since it took a staggering 9 minutes for ROK to realize they are being attacked and figure out the position of DPRK artillery. Further ROK counter fire seems punitive a mere 80 round as compared to 160 rounds fired by DPRK. Conventional tactical doctrine calls for massive counter fire when attacked in order to suppress the enemy fire. However this was not the case in Yeonpyeong the performance of ROK forces were questionable and most importantly the accuracy. Out of 80 rounds only 10 landed in DPRK territory, and for a country which prides itself in electronic supremacy this is a major embarrassment. Whereas, credit has to be given to DPRK accuracy and tenacity in the face of overwhelming technologically superior ROK forces, to the point most shells hit military barracks. After action report from ROK forces clearly shows that all rounds from DPRK slammed onto military targets with some stray shells hitting civilian population. In light of the small size of Yeonpyeong Island and its close proximity between civilian and the ROK Marine barracks it is inevitable that civilian casualties do occur.
Clueless commanders, once the rounds start raining down, on scene commanders seems to lose all initiative. Being forward deployed without any heavy support proves too much for the on scene commander to bear. ROK being indoctrinated with US & Nato military operation method calls for heavy support to be present before initiating an offensive or counter fire. Therefore from the timeline of ROK forces after action report it is clear ROK Marines only returned fire after ROKAF mounted an emergency sortie (whatever that means) close to Yeonpyeong Island. Loss of initiative leads to failure to improvise with minimal support. The ROK Marines commander should have returned fire immediately and requested for close air support/ground interdiction by providing the target coordinates to ROKAF in order to neutralize the point of threat in Mudo and Kaemori.
An incoherent chain of command with orders from the top echelon leaders, ambiguous. After action report reveals orders from Joint Chief of Staffs were “to return fire but not to provoke”. An army relies on clear and unambiguous orders to carry out its mission. Unclear and ambiguous orders will usually leads to confusion and disaster. In essence when the orders came from top upper echelon “return fire but do not provoke” it meant the ROK forces were fighting with one hand tied behind their back.
Equipment failing to perform as per the specification listed by the manufacturer is another factor that needs to be looked into. The main platform/system capable of providing counter fire in Yeonpyeong Island is the Samsung Techwin 155mm Self Propelled Howitzer (SPH) K-9 Thunder. It has an uncanny resemblance of the M109 Paladin the mainstay of US Army SPH. Being equipped with sophisticated on board sensors, it should have neutralized the much outdated North Korean 122mm MLRS. The poor performance of K-9Thunder further adds to the negative perception concerning the ROK force response. The scanning, tracking, target acquisition capability of K-9 seems questionable. If the K-9 Thunder target acquisition was flawless it could have taken out the DPRK artillery within seconds. By using its TOT (time over target) mode it could ripple fire 3 155mm shells within 15 seconds and timed to arrive on target simultaneously with absolute precision.
5.0 POSTCRIPT
ROK forces must have taken all necessary measures to deter the DPRK from undertaking any provocation during the exercise. F-15K and F-16 of ROKAF should have conducted CAP (combat air patrol) sorties during the training, while RF-4 Phantom mount an aerial reconnaissance to monitor situation and take action should the need arise. ROKN should have deployed capital ships KDX-111 and Munmu class destroyers close to Yeonpyeong Island prior to the training exercise to provide over the horizon targeting capability and additional fire-power from its 92 Vertical Launch System (VLS), in case of DPRK provocations.
The ROKM barracks in Yeonpyeong Island should have been reinforced with regular marines/soldiers to supplement the national service marines stationed there. By right ROK forces should have deployed all these elements in order to counter any multitude of threats from DPRK. By check mating DPRK in all potential spectrums of threats and in every dimension of battle, ROK forces might have responded better to the artillery firing on Yeonpyeong. In the aftermath of ROKN Cheonan sinking, ROK forces should have conducted more direct exercises designed to carry out numerous Operational Plan (OPLAN) with a clear deterrence message to DPRK. OPLAN are secret dossiers which outline among others set piece offensive operation against DPRK that would give CFC commanders variety of options. According to a premier military website GlobalSecurity.org, ROK-US forces have specific set of OPLAN for a multitude of threat scenario from DPRK. The CFC regularly conducts brigade and division level exercises to hone their skills in this regards. Therefore ROK should have initiated this set of options available in OPLAN to neutralize the DPRK firing on Yeonpyoeng Island. In fact as a direct response to the bombardment ROK forces should have carried out these OPLAN, instead of conducting live firing exercise. Show of force is designed to deter potential aggressor and not as it literally means as a show for display and entertainment purpose. ROK forces show of force in the aftermath of Choenan and Yeonpyeong seems designed to show ROK citizens that the government considers DPRK aggression seriously and would use is might to vanquish DPRK. ROK rather than conduct a show of force which failed miserably in the aftermath of Cheonan, should have carried out the following OPLAN:-
5.1 OPLAN 5027 (Major Theater War)
This OPLAN calls for the defense of ROK in case of surprise attack by DPRK over the DMZ. 70% of DPRK forces and equipment are poised within 100 miles from DMZ and they could launch surprise attack within moment notice. Further DPRK artillery barrages could fire around 500,000 rounds per hour on Seoul. By taking into account this scenario, ROK forces have the highest density of troops to area ratio in the world. With 1 Division every 10 km, ROK forces are capable of foiling any massive incursion by DPRK. Further the 3 main corridors of entry into South Korea(Kaesong-Munsan, Chorwon and Kumwa) are heavily defended by ROK forces. ROK forces could withstand and absorb a punishing DRPK offensive by holding the line for at least 5 days, during which time reinforcement from US Forces in Japan and US Pacific Command will arrive. Exercise Foal Eagle (RSOI) Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration conducted between USFK and ROK confirms RSOI can be achieved within 5 days. The first 5 days would determine the outcome of the war and based on ROK ORBAT, reinforcement and RSOI timing ROK could hold the line for 5 days. CFC then within 6- 10 days could mount an offensive to crush the DPRK aggression.
5.2 OPLAN 5026 (Air Strikes)
DPRK opting for a nuclear strike is the worst case scenario that could happen in Korean peninsula. By using OPLAN 5026 USAF, USN and ROKAF are capable of mounting pre-emptive simultaneous surgical strike against high value target sites like Yongbyon and other DRPK nuclear facilities site. The combined aerial armada of USAF-ROKAF could neutralize these threats in the event of belligerent posture from DPRK. ROK cannot allow DPRK the option to go nuclear and at the outset of hostilities these sites has to be taken out. OPLAN 5026 are designed specifically for such scenario and based on regular exercise conducted by ROKAF-USAK like COPE Thunder, Cope Korea and Red Flag it has the capability to mount such an audacious strike. By using smart weapons like JDAM and stand off weapons like JSOW, it could severely reduce the war waging capabilities of the North.
5.3 OPLAN 5030 (Roll Back)
The operational plan calls for ROK to fight a battle of attrition with DPRK by slowly strangling and snuffing it out economically. This similar to what United States effectively did to USSR during the cold war.
5.4 Other OPLAN
There are numerous other OPLAN that ROK political leadership could have considered and initiated.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The father of modern strategy Thucydides once quipped “no one is fool enough to choose the path or war instead of peace, in peace sons bury their father and in war father bury their sons”. DPRK has repeatedly provoked and has been on war footing against ROK since 1953. The decision to go to war is not an easy one as there are dire consequences an entire generation may be wiped out as it happened during WW1. At the same time ROK should not allow it to be held at ransom by DPRK.
Edward Luttwak in his article “Give War A Chance” wrote the natural phenomena of war has to be given an opportunity for it to come to a decisive and conclusive end. War has to come to end on its own without the intervention of peace-keeping force, ceasefire or mediation. It has to end with one side capitulating. This is more so in the case of Korean peninsula, in which both Koreas has been technically at war since 1953. Both ROK and DPRK should stop being the pawn in the superpower games of political chess by initiating a full scale war with one side emerging as the sole victor and unifier of Korea.
The onus is more on ROK which is technologically, militarily and economically more superior that DPRK to bring to end the division of Korea. The sinking of Cheonan and bombardment of Yeonpyeong provided ROK with such an opportunity but it failed to re-act upon it. Instead MB Lee went on with soap opera style rhetoric and ordered pointless live firing exercise without any iron fist response. The latest debacle on Pyeongyeong clearly proves that DPRK is not deterred by ROK and ROK does not have the political will to retaliate. The DRPK is aware of this lack of will on the part ROK leadership and in every incident DPRK manage to yield maximum political, economical and not forgetting face saving mileage at the expense of ROK.
The only way to end this unending cycle of violence is for ROK to mount a lightning and crippling blitzkrieg on DPRK. It would provide the DPRK with a fait accompli before it could recover from the initial shock. It has to do it urgently since with the DRPK leadership baton passed on to a young Kim Jong Un, who has the rest of his life to continue what is forefathers did extremely well, which is to terrorize the south.
Jeyaganesh Gopalsamy
LLB Hons (WALES), M.A Strategy (UKM)
14th of January, 2011
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